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Abstract
In this article, polarization measurement is presented as a useful tool for characterizing the
net transfers of income between individuals caused by a tax reform. The bipolarization
measure, which considers just two poles and involves the disappearance of the middle class,
may complement inequality measures insofar as it provides an alternative explanation of the
distributional impact of inequality neutral tax reforms. Some theoretical implications of an
inequality− and revenue−neutral tax reform concerning polarization are examined. We
conclude with an empirical application where we carry out a simulation to evaluate the
effects on polarization of a potential substitution of the current Spanish tax system for an
inequality− and revenue− neutral linear tax.
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Recent tax system reforms in western economies provide evidence of an international
trend towards the flattening of income tax structures. Efficiency gains are considered the main
reason to move from a progressive tax system with graduated tax rates to one with a personal
allowance and a single marginal tax rate. However, the redistributive pattern of linear tax
reforms is complex can be regarded as an application of a set of composite transfers, both
progressive and regressive at the lower and higher tails of the initial distribution, respectively.
Nevertheless, we consider that not only inequality measurement but also polarization
measurement has to be considered as far as the net transfers of these reforms are concerned
1.
Whereas inequality relates to the overall dispersion of the distribution, polarization
concentrates on the income distribution on several focal or polar modes. A particular class of
polarization is the bipolarization measure, which considers just two poles. Since, linear tax
reform benefits both the poor and the rich, at the expense of the middle class, bipolarization
measurement appears to be a useful tool for characterizing the net transfers of income between
individuals caused by this kind of fiscal reform.
In this paper we analyze the effects of inequality- and revenue-neutral (non-necessarily
linear) tax reforms. All possible scenarios of polarization changes are described in order to
characterize the possible net transfers of a tax reform. Finally, a fiscal policy simulation is
carried out to illustrate the theoretical results of the paper on bipolarization by substituting the
Spanish tax system for an equivalent linear tax. We make use of the ECHP data set to carry out
the fiscal reform simulations.
2. Polarization versus Inequality
Polarization is a different concept from inequality as it has been formally defined in the
literature. According to Wolfson (1994), a more bipolarized income distribution is one that is
more spread out from the middle, so there are fewer individuals or families with middle level
incomes. In addition, there is a sense that this spreading out is also associated with tendency
towards bimodality, a clumping of formerly middle level incomes at either higher or lower
levels.
Following Rodríguez and Salas (2002) approach, the Wolfson bipolarization index can be
obtained by subtracting the within-groups from the between-groups Gini coefficients, computed
for groups separated by the median value:
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where m is the median, µ  is the mean, G
B is the between-groups Gini coefficient and G
W is the
within-groups Gini coefficient, computed for groups separated by the median value. Notice that
the subgroup income ranges do not overlap, and therefore there is an exact decomposition of the
                                                          
1 Many papers agree on the conceptual difference between polarization and inequality; see for instance, Wolfson
(1994, 1997), Esteban and Ray (1994), Esteban, Gradín, and Ray (1999) and Rodríguez and Salas (2002).2
Gini coefficient into between-groups and within-groups contributions.
Furthermore, Rodríguez and Salas (2002) proposed the extended Wolfson bipolarization
measure: P(v) = G
B(v) – G
W(v) in which the bipolarization measure depends on a sensitivity
parameter v associated to the extended Gini coefficient defined by Donaldson and Weymark
(1980) and Yitzhaki (1983).
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3. Theoretical Scenarios for the bipolarization Impact of a Tax Reform
We consider a tax reform and it is also assumed that behavior is unaltered by the tax
system under consideration. As long as we consider a revenue- and inequality-neutral tax reform,
polarization is the only variable that can change.
We have shown that polarization and inequality are different concepts from the
theoretical point of view. Now, we turn to the nature of the theoretical relationship between
polarization and inequality. Unfortunately, we find that this relationship is not unambiguous in
that positive or negative correlation between both terms depends on the variance of the within-
relative to the between-groups Gini coefficients. Let us illustrate this result.
The covariance between the polarization and the inequality measures is given by:
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If we substitute polarization and inequality indices for the within- and between-groups inequality
terms, we obtain:
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and after tedious calculation we conclude that:
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Therefore, polarization can increase, decrease or be constant whenever an inequality-
neutral tax reform is considered. We thus identify three possible scenarios. We are going to show
that polarization goes along with the between-groups inequality component in this context.
Scenario 1: Polarization remains unchanged. Not only do the revenue and inequality measures
remain unchanged but also the polarization measure remains unchanged. As G(v) = G
B(v) +
G




W(v) have to remain constant as well.
                                                          
2 In Rodriguez and Salas (2003) is proved that given a particular income distribution X, the extended Wolfson bi-
polarization measure, P(v), is consistent with the second polarization curve if v∈  [2, 3]. A bipolarization index is
consistent with the second polarization curve if a progressive median-preserving transfer within (between) polar
subgroups never reduces (increases) polarization.3
Scenario 2: Polarization increases. The polarization measure increases when G
B(v) goes up,
G
W(v) goes down, or both indices increase and decrease at the same time. However, when the
extended Gini coefficient is unchanged, only the last option is possible. Thus, the extended
between-groups Gini index increases and the extended within-groups Gini coefficient decreases
in this scenario.
Scenario 3: Polarization decreases. By similar reasoning, the extended between-groups Gini
index decreases and the extended within-groups Gini coefficient increases under this scenario.
Proposition:  Let consider an inequality-neutral tax reform, then polarization changes along with
the between-groups inequality component:
∆ P(v) > 0 ⇔  ∆ G
B(v) > 0                                                       (5)
∆ P(v) = 0 ⇔  ∆ G
B(v) = 0                                                       (6)
We can illustrate the intuitions and implications of this result with the following exercise.
Let consider a revenue- inequality-neutral exercise that changes from a piecewise increasing
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where t is the marginal tax rate and A is the personal allowance or the minimum threshold below
which tax liability is zero (similar as in Davies and Hoy, 2002).





The whole population is separated into two groups by the median value and a piecewise
progressive income tax structure (blue line in Figure 1) is substituted by a linear tax system (pink
line). On the one hand, there cannot be any transfer between both groups when the extended
between-groups Gini coefficient, G
B(v), has to remain constant. On the other hand, it has been
pointed out by Davies and Hoy (2002) that a linear tax reform benefits both the poor and the
rich, at the expense of the middle class, as can be observed in the Figure 1. This means that two
sorts of income transfers within the groups are occurring at the same time: a progressive income
transfer within the poorest group and a regressive income transfer within the richest group.
Moreover, in order to obtain unchanged extended within-groups Gini coefficient, G
W(v), the
progressive and the regressive transfers have to exactly compensate to each other.
Figure 2 represents the second scenario when polarization increases. The income transfer
between both groups is regressive and the progressive transfer within the poorest income group
overcomes the regressive transfer within the richest income group.
Figure 2. Scenario 2: polarization increases.
In Figure 3 (scenario 3) the income transfer between both groups is progressive and the






Figure 3. Scenario 3: polarization decreases.
Therefore, the analysis of a revenue- and inequality-neutral linear tax reform through its
effects on polarization allow us to characterize in a very simple way the different sort of transfers
that occur between and within the income groups. In sum, this approach allows us to evaluate all
the income transfers from the upper and lower middle classes.
4. A linear tax simulation exercise
In this section we carry out a simulation exercise in order to evaluate the empirical effects
of the substitution of the Spanish tax system for a revenue- and inequality-equivalent linear tax.
We use micro-data drawn from the ECHP panel database for 1997. The sample comprises 13,705
individuals. The equivalent income Y
e is computed using the Buhmann et al. (1988) and Coulter
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where N is the household size and α  is the equivalent scale parameter in the household. All
observations are weighted according to the number of persons in the household. Results are





different equivalent scales and different extended Gini inequality aversion parameters.
Table 1: Linear tax simulations under constant revenue and vertical redistribution



















































































Source: ECHP database 1997. Sample size (N): 5427 households (13705 individuals).
It can be observed that linear tax reform increases bipolarization (except from α  = 0.75
and v ≥  2). Therefore, in this simulation we are in Scenario 2, where between-groups inequality
is increased and within-groups inequality is reduced (see Figure 2).
Furthermore, in Figure 4, we present the percentage of losers by income centiles. In
general terms, it is observed that the higher the income centile, the higher the percentage of
losers, except for the last two centiles where the percentage of losers decrease dramatically. This
result is to be expected in that the winners should be concentrated in both extremes of the income
distribution.7
Figure 4. Percentage of losers by centiles.
Thus, real-data results confirm the theoretical result about the net transfers in the middle-
class income levels highlighted in Section 3 and summarised by the idea behind Figure 2. In this
context, our linear tax reform simulation is, in most of the cases, consistent with a regressive net
transfer from the low-middle to upper-middle income individuals.
5. Concluding remarks
This article evaluates the polarization effects of inequality- and revenue-neutral tax
reforms. Indeed, it can be shown that results are maintained under non revenue-neutrality. The
set of net transfers that these fiscal reforms generate is characterized. Using the extended
Wolfson bipolarization measure, all potential polarization scenarios are identified, from a
theoretical point of view, and it allows us to characterize the net transfers that this tax reform
would produce. One important result is that bipolarization changes along with between-groups
inequality: bipolarization goes up (down) if and only if between-groups inequality goes up
(down).
Finally, we illustrate this intuition by making use of graphical analysis applied to linear
tax reforms. In the same way, these results can be extended to many other examples such as
public utility pricing reforms or more general neural inequality public policy reforms.8
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